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Critical Notices
Hester Lessard* Siberian Tigers and Exotic Birds:
Ronald Dworkin's Map of the
Sacred
At its most abstract, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion,
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom is a meditation on the nature of
individual freedom. However, as author Ronald Dworkin explains at the
end of Chapter One, he believes in doing philosophy in much the same
way common law jurists believe in doing law-from the inside out-that
is, by starting with a concrete problem and then proceeding to the more
general questions raised by that problem. According to Dworkin, this
generates a theory that is appropriately tailored to the issue, "Savile Row"
so to speak, rather than "Seventh Avenue, ' 2 and thus a theory that is more
likely to improve the quality of public debate. The crucible for Dworkin's
theory in this instance is the debate over abortion and constitutional
rights. Although euthanasia is discussed in the last two chapters of the
book, it is not as comprehensively explored as the abortion issue. Indeed,
it is plausible to read the book as an elaborate justification of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision on abortion rights, Roe v. Wade,3 which Dworkin
suggests may be the most famous case in America, if not the world.4 The
majority in Roe v. Wade found that although women's constitutional
privacy rights entitle them to choose to terminate a pregnancy, those
rights diminish as their pregnancies progress in accordance with a
trimester framework.
I shall focus my discussion on what Dworkin has to say about abortion
and, in particular, on his elaboration of the role that conceptions of "the
sacred" play in liberal justifications for state restrictions on women's
access to abortion. For Dworkin, "the sacred" comprises a complex set of
intuitions about why certain things are treated as if they have intrinsic
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I would like to extend thanks
to Donald Galloway, Nitya Iyer, and Margot Young for their thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts of this essay, and to Richard Devlin for his editorial assistance.
1. R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual
Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) at 29 [hereinafter Life's Dominion).
2. Ibid.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 102.
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value. I am interested in comparing Dworkin's analysis of the role of "the
sacred" with feminist analyses of abortion and of reproductive issues
generally. In varying degrees, access to abortion as an aspect of reproduc-
tive self-determination has been a central part of numerous feminist
political agendas, especially in North America. Yet, while some Ameri-
can women view Roe v. Wade as an important plank in the reproductive
freedom platform, the case has also been the subject of feminist criticism
on a number of bases, including its articulation of the trimester frame-
work and the wider implications of a rights claim based on privacy. Much
of what Dworkin has to say is a defence of these two aspects of the Roe
v. Wade decision.
My essay is organized around four theses that Dworkin sets out to
demonstrate: first, that most reasonable Americans do not adhere to the
belief that the foetus is a person, and, therefore, liberal moral principles
appropriately reflect that view; second, that the privacy rationale on
which the majority inRoe v. Wade based its reasons makes sense in terms
of liberal moral principles and constitutional law, and privacy doctrine's
detractors-Robert Bork on the right and feminists on the left-are
incoherent; third, that most reasonable Americans agree that abortion on
demand, especially for late stage abortions, is problematic given liberal
society's moral commitments to the sanctity of human life. To this end,
Dworkin provides the reader with a detailed map of conceptions of "the
sacred" within liberal society. Finally, Dworkin devotes three chapters to
explaining how U.S. constitutional law, in particular Roe v. Wade, fits his
account of "the sacred" while at the same time respecting human freedom
and autonomy.
I. Confused Conservatives and the Foetal Personhood Debate
In the first chapter, called "The Edges of Life," Dworkin proposes that the
conventional understanding of the abortion debate in terms of whether or
not a foetus is a person with rights is rooted in "widespread intellectual
confusion. ' 5 The confusion resides in the failure to distinguish between
concerns about foetal personhood and concerns about sanctity of life.
While it is true, Dworkin explains, that pro-life advocates believe
absolutely that foetal life is intrinsically valuable, it is not true, on close
examination of their claims, that they believe in foetal personhood.
Furthermore, while it is true that most pro-choice advocates vigorously
reject the notion of foetal personhood, it is not true that they reject the
notion that foetal life is intrinsically valuable. In short, according to
5. Ibid. at 10.
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Dworkin, the main contenders in the battle over abortion rights agree that
foetuses are not persons but are nonetheless intrinsically valuable. The
area of contention lies, instead, around the meaning and consequences of
the idea that human life is intrinsically valuable. In constitutional terms,
this is appropriately characterized, not as a debate over foetal rights, but
rather as a debate over the extent to which the state can legitimately take
steps to protect the intrinsic value of human life without compromising
liberal commitments to individual freedom.
Dworkin develops the conceptual distinction between "derivative"
and "detached" objections to abortion as an aid to understanding the
structure of the abortion debate. Objections to abortion based on foetal
personhood are "derivative" because they are derived from the notion of
foetal rights and interests. On this view, abortion is murder because it
"violates someone's right not to be killed, just as killing an adult is
normally wrong because it violates the adult's right not to be killed."6
Objections to abortion based on sanctity of life, however, are "detached"
because they are rooted in a claim about governmental responsibility that
is detached from rights. On this view, government is obliged to protect
against abortion, not because abortion is murder, but because abortion
"disregards and insults the intrinsic value, the sacred character, of any
stage or form of human life."'7 Dworkin claims that the derivative/
detached distinction is the key to defusing the explosive rhetoric of the
life versus choice debate and clarifying its terms. Most people, as
Dworkin explains more fully in the second chapter, have "detached"
rather than "derivative" objections to abortion. The life side of the life
versus choice debate is about the sacredness of human life, not about
rights to life.
The derivative/detached distinction seems to promise more than it
actually delivers. The distinction reduces to a question of whether or not
rights are the basis of the claim. However, it does not explain why pro-
life groups have consistently resorted to the language of rights. Dworkin
seems to genuinely believe that they are doing so inadvertently and
sloppily. He does not consider that pro-life groups may be using rights
language with great deliberation and insight, simply because it has
currency and authority in political as well as legal discourse. This latter
possibility is especially important in light of Dworkin's stated objective
of not simply contributing to the enterprise of political and legal philoso-
phy but also "improv[ing] the quality of public political argument."'
6. Ibid. at 11.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. at28.
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Apart from this however, the derivative/detached distinction is key to
understanding what I think is Dworkin's more difficult argument, namely
that a liberal who takes rights seriously might nevertheless agree that a
substantial amount of state interference in women's reproductive au-
tonomy is justified. The elaboration of this latter point is the heart of the
book and is pursued over the course of several middle chapters.
The second chapter is devoted to examining the intellectual confusion
surrounding the abortion debate in more detail. For convenience, Dworkin
assumes that the significant players in the debate are liberals and
conservatives.9 He then proceeds to explain how, except for those at the
extreme end of the conservative spectrum, both liberals and conserva-
tives espouse views that would permit exceptions to a complete prohibi-
tion of abortion by the state. Dworkin's point is simple: most of the
exceptions are inconsistent with a belief that a foetus is a human person
with rights that attract moral as well as legal recognition. For example, he
argues, even extremely conservative pro-life advocates commonly be-
lieve that it is permissible for a doctor to abort a foetus where pregnancy
endangers the mother's life. While self-defence might justify the mother
killing a person who threatens her life, it is inconsistent with most moral
views, liberal or conservative, to permit third parties to kill an innocent
person in order to save another. The rape exception makes even less
sense, given that the foetus is not guilty of any crime. Thus, Dworkin
concludes, "conservative opposition to abortion does not presume that a
fetus is a person with a right to live."10
This demolishment of the conservative position is accomplished
skillfully. If one believes that Roe v. Wade is important and that its major
weakness is its failure to address foetal rights, then Dworkin's dissection
of the logical contradiction inherent in conservative support for both
foetal personhood and the endangerment to life and rape exceptions is
useful and strategically significant. However, given the depth of resis-
tance to meaningful access to abortion services, Dworkin's analysis is as
9. Ibid. at 31. Dworkin concedes that "people's opinions about abortion do not come in only
two varieties, conservative and liberal." However, he supposes "that people are spread along
a conservative-liberal spectrum because this will make it easier to describe [his] main points"
(ibid.).
10. Ibid. at 32.
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likely to result in conservatives jettisoning the two exceptions. More
importantly, the barriers to abortion access are not attributable simply to
intellectually confused or immoderate conservatives. The way in which
notions of foetal personhood function ideologically" to justify institu-
tional and material constraints on women's access to abortion needs to be
examined. In particular, the interconnections between the conservative
discourse of foetal personhood and the medical discourse of foetal
patienthood 2 reveal the way in which the "scalding rhetoric" 13 of the
former is legitimized and authorized by the latter. Within medical
practice, a pregnant woman is increasingly viewed as the "maternal
environment" for the foetal "patient." 14 In this way, the wider currency of
the notion, promoted by the right-to-life movement, of the foetus as a
helpless child vulnerable to the selfish and erratic whims of aborting
women, renders medical circumvention of the autonomy of pregnant
women in order to save or protect a foetus a feat of obvious and laudable
heroism. 15
The ideological impact of notions of foetal personhood on medical
practice is perhaps most clearly discernible in the context of court-
ordered caesarean sections. Consider, for example, the case of In reA. C. 16
in which a Superior Court judge in the District of Columbia ordered
doctors to perform a caesarean to deliver the foetus of a woman, Angela
Carder, who was twenty six and one half weeks pregnant and dying of
cancer. Carder was unconscious at the time of the original order. How-
ever, she regained consciousness shortly afterwards and refused to give
her consent to the procedure. The trial court, nevertheless, declined a
11. I am using the concept of ideology to mean a process through which ideas and beliefs are
rendered natural, commonsensical, and seemingly detached from specific historical or institu-
tional interests and practices. Thus, in the context of the abortion debate, for example, the
ideology of foetal personhood seems to make it obvious that abortion is an unnatural murderous
act and, at the same time, obscures the way in which constraints on access to abortion are rooted
in historically specific social practices and privileges. For a discussion of the concept of
ideology and of the relationship between law and ideology, see S.A.M. Gavigan, "Law, Gender
and Ideology" in A. Bayefsky, ed., Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice (Edmonton: Academic
Printing and Publishing, 1988) 283.
12. R.P. Petchesky, "Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduc-
tion" (1987) 13 Fern. Stud. 263 at 271 [hereinafter "Fetal Images"]. Petchesky uses the term
foetal patienthood to describe the medical presumption of foetal autonomy.
13. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 13.
14. "Fetal Images," supra note 12 at 277. See also R.P. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's
Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1984) at 350 [hereinafter Abortion and Woman's Choice].
15. Abortion and Woman's Choice, ibid. at 353.
16. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988), trial court decision
vacated and case remanded following hearing en bane, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990).
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request to change the order and adhered to the position that her refusal of
consent was not clear. Her lawyer applied to the Court of Appeals for a
stay. The application for stay was denied in a hastily held hearing by
telephone. The prematurely delivered child died two hours after the
operation. Angela Carder died two days later.
The reasons for denial of Carder's application for a stay were issued
several months after the decision. 7 The Court of Appeals invoked the
state interest in protecting potential life articulated in Roe v. Wade,"S and
explained that it based its decision on the "medical judgement" that the
foetus had a better chance of survival than Carder.' 9 It did so even though
the surgery may have hastened Carder's death. 20
The decision did not go unnoticed. As one commentator has written:
In re A. C. caused a furor in medical and legal circles. One outraged
commentator wrote that the judges "treated a live woman as though she
were already dead... then justified their brutal and unprincipled opinion
on the basis that she was almost dead and her fetus' interests in life
outweighed any interest she might have in her own life or health." The
case, a stark illustration of the conflict between the competing interests of
the fetus and the mother, was characterized as a "human sacrifice" by the
patient's lawyer.2'
Carder's family and a large number of organizations asked the Court
of Appeals to reconsider its decision.' The Court vacated the trial
judgment and scheduled the matter for reargument.Y3 At the subsequent
rehearing, a majority of the Court of Appeals vacated the trial judge's
order on the basis that he had failed to determine whether or not Carder
was competent to decide if she wanted surgery and, if incompetent, what
her substituted judgment would be.24 However, the majority also stated
that while patients have a right to refuse medical treatment, this right can
be overridden where the state interest in preserving life is truly compel-
ling. The majority observed that this is usually where the courts have
"acted to vindicate the state's interest in protecting third parties, even if
in fetal state."5
17. InreA.C. (D.C. 1987), ibid.
18. Ibid. at614.
19. Ibid. at 613.
20. Ibid.
21. M. Diamond, "Echoes from Darkness: The Case of Angela C." (1989-90) 51 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 1061 at 1062 citing G. Annas, "She's Going to Die: The Case of Angela C." (1988) 18
Hastings Cent. Rep. 23 at 25, and O'Brien, "Patient's Lawyer Calls A.C. Case Human
Sacrifice" American Medical News (11 March 1988) 18.
22. Diamond, ibid.
23. In reA.C. (D.C. 1988), supra note 16.
24. In reA.C. (D.C. App. 1990), supra note 16.
25. Ibid. at 1246.
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In re A. C. is an example of the growing trend to seek court orders to
override the decisions pregnant women make regarding their medical
treatment. A recent survey of directors of maternal-foetal fellowship
programs in the United States found that forty-six percent of the respon-
dents favoured detention of pregnant women whose refusal of medical
advice endangers the foetus, and forty-seven percent endorsed judicial
intervention to compel caesarean sections, intrauterine transfusions, and
other medical procedures to save the life of the foetus.2 6 Twenty-six
percent "advocated state surveillance of women in the third trimester who
stay outside the hospital system. 2 7 The survey also found that in eighteen
out of twenty-one cases in which judicial applications were made to
override pregnant women's treatment decisions, the order was granted.28
In addition, not only are many cases unreported,29 but, on one account,
doctors have performed caesareans without consent and without a court
order.3 0
Arguably, most of these cases fit comfortably within Dworkin's
concept of justified state action on the basis of a "detached" interest in
foetal life. In re A. C., in so far as it contemplates state intervention in
individual medical treatment decisions where the intervention would
actually hasten the individual's death in order to save a foetus, is perhaps
distinguishable from the other cases. However, they all rely on medical
judgment with respect to what is hastening death, endangering life, or
simply affecting health, and what is required to protect potential life.
These medical judgments, as in In re A. C., are, in turn, the basis for the
26. V.E.B. Kolder, J. Gallagher &M.T. Parsons, "Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions"
(1987) 316:19 New Eng. J. Med. 1192 at 1193.
27. Ibid. at 1193-94.
28. Ibid. at 1193.
29. L.C. Ikemoto, "Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women" (1992) 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 487 at 489.
30. R. Jurow & R. H. Paul, "Cesarean Delivery for Fetal Distress Without Maternal Consent"
(1984) 63 Obstet. & Gyn. 596 at 596-98 cited in Ikemoto, ibid.
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courts' articulation of the constitutional limits on women's choices. In
other instances, legislatures specifically delegate to doctors the power to
determine when considerations of health warrant access to medical
services.3' Thus it is medical professionals who are effectively drawing
the boundary between women's autonomy and state power. This is not to
suggest that such professionals are acting unethically or incompetently.
However, given the import of medical decisions in these contexts, the
implicit priorities and assumptions of medical practice and knowledge
merit greater investigation and discussion than Dworkin has given them.
Indeed, throughout his essay, Dworkin treats medical and scientific
knowledge about the human body as completely transparent and devoid
31. Carol Smart characterizes the deferral to medical knowledge within law as an instance of
the way in which law's power is overshadowed by medical discourse. C. Smart, Feminism and
the Power of Law (New York: Routledge, 1989) at 17-20. However, Smart suggests that we
should not assume from such instances that law has relinquished its role as the central
mechanism of power to scientific disciplines such as medicine. Rather, she suggests that law,
in particular the language of rights, acts in concert with medicine and other disciplinary
mechanisms. Indeed, in some instances, law's power is extended into new areas of regulation
by the expansion of medical and social scientific knowledge. Smart uses the examples of the
medical construction of homosexuality as a perversion and the medical and psychological
construction of children as a distinct category of persons in need of protection and special
treatment. In both instances, law incorporated the discourses of the human sciences in the
extension of its power overnew areas of social and personal life (ibid. at 15-17). Similarly, the
medical construction of the foetus as a patient provides the basis for the extension of legal rights
to the foetus and for the imposition of extensive legal controls on the actions of pregnant
women.
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of interpretive difficulty, much less ideological shaping. For Dworkin, it
seems that science reflects the natural world back at us in increasingly
remarkable detail, without distortion, and coincidentally, in ways that
affirm liberal intuitions about the ordering of social life.3
2
Anumber of feminist analyses of law have endeavouredto problematize
the way in which medical and legal knowledge both reinforce and inform
each other within the larger context of social subordination.33 For ex-
ample, in her exploration of how conservative claims of foetal personhood
appear to be verified by sonographic images of the foetus floating
disconnected from any woman's body, Rosalind Petchesky challenges
the assumption that the separation of maternal and foetal interests is a
medical fact rather than a political judgment. She writes:
But the presumption of fetal "autonomy" ("patienthood" if not
"personhood") is not an inevitable requirement of the technologies.
Rather, the technologies take on the meanings and uses they do because of
32. Although Dworkin uses scientific claims to buttress and give content to his own claims
about the moral issues at stake in abortion, he never actually discusses the problems of scientific
interpretation in Life's Dominion. In Law's Empire, there are several indirect references to the
nature of scientific interpretation. For example, he distinguishes scientific interpretation from
other types of interpretation by observing that it is concerned with "events not created by
people" and that it is "causal" in a "mechanical way" (R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge,
Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986) at 50 [hereinafter Law's
Empire]). The same assumptions about the nature of scientific interpretation manifest them-
selves in Dworkin's discussion of the difference between claims of objectivity in moral
discourse and similar claims in science. Within the former, Dworkin writes, the language of
objectivity functions to repeat, emphasize, or qualify the content of aclaim (ibid. at 81). Within
the latter, it functions as an assertion that there is a verifiable causal explanation for a claim.
He further elaborates by explaining how absurd it would be to treat a moral claim that slavery
is wrong "the way [one] might prove some claim of physics, by arguments of fact or logic every
rational person must accept: by showing that atmospheric moral quaverings confirm [one's]
opinion, for example, orthatit matches anoumenal metaphysical fact" (ibid. at 80-81). Shortly
afterwards he asserts: "We do not say (nor can we understand anyone who does say) that
interpretation is like physics or that moral values are 'out there' or can be proved" (ibid. at 83).
In these passages, Dworkin is using common understandings of scientific interpretation to
explore and highlight the complexities of interpretive claims about legal and other social
practices. His focus is not on the nature of scientific knowledge or interpretation. In Life's
Dominion, scientific claims are similarly treated as straightforward causal explanations that do
not raise complex questions about the relationship between the interpreter's aims, the practices
of the community, and the object of interpretation. However, unlike Law's Empire, in Life's
Dominion scientific claims provide the basis for many of Dworkin's interpretations of the
moral commitments and legal practices that characterize liberal societies. My point is that,
given this enlarged role in Dworkin's analysis for scientific and medical information about
human biology, the problems and complexities of scientific interpretation warrant closer
inspection.
33. See Smart, supra note 31; Abortion and Woman's Choice, supra note 14; and . Brodie,
S.A.M. Gavigan & J. Jenson, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1992).
I I 1 -
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the cultural climate of fetal images and the politics of hostility toward
pregnant women and abortion. As a result, the pregnant woman is
increasingly put in the position of adversary to her own pregnancy/fetus,
either by having presented a "hostile environment" to its development or
by actively refusing some medically proposed intervention (such as a
cesarean section or treatment for a fetal "defect"). 34
Lisa Ikemoto would further complicate Petchesky's analysis. Ikemoto
discusses, from the perspective of intersecting axes of social oppression,
the same survey of directors of maternal-foetal fellowships mentioned
earlier.3 1 She points out that in seventeen of the cases in which court
orders were sought to force pregnant women to undergo medical treat-
ment, the women were either Black, Hispanic or Asian. In addition, "all
of the orders were sought against women being treated at public hospitals
or receiving public assistance."36 In Ilkemoto' s view, one must look at the
way the institutionalized authority of the medical profession which is
"presumed to be a source of valuable knowledge and truth '37 internalizes
racial, cultural, and class based stereotypes of good and bad mothers."
Dworkin's account of the conservative position leaves one without
any sense of the nature and complexity of the conceptual separation
between pregnant women and foetuses. Indeed, the general structure of
Dworkin's essay reinforces that separation. As noted above, he creates a
moral world for his reader that is peopled mostly by reasonable liberals
and moderate conservatives. This community of thoughtful and con-
cerned moral actors contemplates the problem of the foetus with very
little reference to the women whose bodies nurture foetal life. When
women appear, as they do more frequently in Dworkin's elaboration of
the liberal position,39 they have personal concerns or aspirations that
place them in opposition to their foetuses.4 ° It is a sign of the success of
the pro-life movement that one cannot discuss abortion without, to a
certain extent, participating in the construction of foetuses as separate and
distinct entities. However, Dworkin never acknowledges that the separa-
tion itself is an interpretive claim which must be scrutinized as carefully
as the more inflammatory pro-life arguments.
In addition, I think the flatness of Dworkin's account of conservative
politics can be at least partially attributed to his overall interpretive
34. "Fetal Images," supra note 12 at 271-72.
35. Ikemoto, supra note 29 at 510 citing Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note 26.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. at 512.
38. Ibid. at510-12.
39. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
40. Ibid.
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approach which makes a virtue of reordering claims and practices so that
they appear in the best light from the perspective, ultimately, of the
established order. In Law's Empire, he espouses an approach to the
interpretation of art and social practices that is constructive in the sense
that it is "a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order
to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it
is taken to belong."4 The key question is, How does one attempt to
determine what constitutes the best for any area of practice? With respect
to social practices such as law, Dworkin answers by suggesting that we
endeavour to determine what is best by proposing a justification in the
form of a principle or aim which fits the standing features of the practice
examined." The proposed aims and principles need not be uncontested.
Nor need they be widely shared within the community. However, an
interpreter's claims about the nature of the principles or aims underlying
the practice will be judged in accordance with how well they fit and
explain the various aspects and characteristics of the standing practice.43
Furthermore, the degree of fit required in order to make a persuasive
claim about the meaning of a practice is determined in accordance with
community standards which, although situated historically, must be
41. Law's Empire, supra note 32 at 52. Dworkin calls the interpretation of art and social
practices "creative interpretation" in order to distinguish it from scientific interpretation and
conversational interpretation. The latter is aimed at deciding what another person has said. The
former is aimed at providing a causal explanation of phenomenological data. Creative
interpretation is different from both of these because it is aimed at interpreting "something
created by people as an entity distinct from them, rather than what people say, as in
conversational interpretation, or events not created by people, as in scientific interpretation"
(ibid. at 50).
42. Ibid. at 66.
43. Ibid. at 66-67.
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widely shared. 4 One can infer from Dworkin's analysis of competing
claims about the nature of American legal practice that his sense of how
closely such claims should fit existing practices allows for very little
leeway. For example, Dworkin dismisses the claim advanced by some
critical scholars that legal thought and practice is so fundamentally
contradictory that a coherent interpretation of its principles is impos-
sible.45 In Dworkin' s view such a claim cannot be taken seriously because
its proponents "have [not] looked for a less skeptical interpretation and
failed."46 He goes on to state that such critics must "show that the flawed
and contradictory account is the only one available." 47
In Life's Dominion, the aspect of legal practice under examination is
the holding in Roe v. Wade that women have rights of reproductive
autonomy which can be significantly limited by government. Each
chapter is, in a sense, a step in the constructive interpretation of Roe v.
Wade with reference to the purposes and principles that underlie legal
practice within the American political community. Dworkin's construc-
tive approach is deployed to defend Roe v. Wade by giving the worst or
most restricted interpretation to any view that is inconsistent with his
understanding of the political and moral vision of the U.S. Constitution,
44. Ibid. at 67-68. This is an extremely over-simplified account of Dworkin's very elaborate
and careful discussion of interpretation. A slightly less simplified account is as follows.
Constructive interpretation has three analytically distinct stages. The first "pre-interpretive"
stage is the identification of "the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of
the practice" (ibid. at 65-66). Dworkin indicates that there must be a large degree of consensus
within the community at this stage. Thus with respect to law, lawyers and legal scholars within
a specific culture must largely agree on "exactly which practices should count as practices of
law" (ibid. at 91). The second "interpretive" stage consists of fitting the proposed purpose or
aim of the practice with the standing features of the practice. The required closeness of the fit
will also depend on a roughly shared consensus about fit within the community (ibid. at 67-
68). However, the substantive convictions of the interpreter about what aims and purposes
show the practice in its best light need not be so widely shared (ibid.). Fortunately for legal
theorists, however, there is considerable agreement, at least provisionally and at a very abstract
level, with respect to the general purpose of law, namely that it is "to guide and constrain the
power of government" in accordance with "individual rights and responsibilities flowing from
past political decisions about when collective force is justified" (ibid. at 93). Thus, interpretive
disagreement within legal practice is, for the most part, at a much less abstract level. It is largely
over which of several rival conceptions of law is "the best interpretation of what lawyers, law
teachers, and judges actually do and much of what they say" (ibid. at 94). Finally, if the
interpretive claim succeeds as the best interpretation possible, the practice in question may be
reformed at the post-interpretive stage in order to better reflect the underlying principle or aim
of the practice. For the purposes of my discussion, the most problematic feature of Dworkin's
constructive interpretive approach is the ultimate importance given to a large degree of
consistency with the established practices within the community.
45. Ibid. at 274.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
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and, conversely, by giving the best or most expansive interpretation to
any view that is supportive of that vision.
The rhetorical moves which characterize Dworkin's constructive
approach are roughly similar to those which lawyers within the common
law tradition are trained to apply to the interpretation of precedent,
namely to give unwelcome precedents a narrow and strict reading (using
their facts or procedural contexts to limit the breadth of the application of
the case) and to give welcome precedents a broad and expansive reading
(interpreting their holdings as authoritative with respect to a wide range
of factual and procedural contexts).4 1 In many respects, Dworkin treats
both conservative and feminist critiques of Roe v. Wade the way lawyers
treat unwelcome precedents. He interprets symbolic language narrowly
and literally, emphasizes logical inconsistencies, and limits broad claims
to their factual or historical circumstances.
Perhaps Dworkin's constructive approach to interpreting law, in
particular his sense of the community's requirement of fit with estab-
lished practices, makes sense in the institutional context of judicial
decisionmaking. However, the arena of scholarly and political debate is
generally less constrainedby the social values of stability and predictabil-
ity that attend direct application of the state's coercive power. Indeed,
scholars who have sought to illuminate the link between established
traditions of thought and social inequalities in power have referred to the
need to engage in "methodological rebellions."4 9 Dworkin's sense of
what counts as a coherent critique of legal practice, namely that it should
be the only account available, is constructed in a way that inevitably
perpetuates the dominant conception of what is politically important and
implicitly keeps marginal what is marginal.50 An interpretive approach
48. See K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Oceana Publications, 1951) at 66-
69 for a succinct account of what Llewellyn calls the "two faced doctrine of precedent" (ibid.
at 69). Llewellyn characterizes the strict approach to the interpretation of precedent, whereby
a case is given its minimum value as a guide to future cases, as follows: "It is the recognized,
legitimate, honorable technique for whittling precedents away, for making the lawyer, in his
argument, and the court, in its decision, free of them. It is a surgeon's knife" (ibid. at 67).
49. J.M. Vickers, 'Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological Rebellions of
Feminist Research" in G. Finn & A.R. Miles, eds., Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to
Politics (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) 27. Vickers discusses the need to challenge and
explore the link between the methodological canons of traditional research and social
domination.
50. Karl Llewellyn observes that the notion that the common law should develop in
accordance with precedent is rooted in the same "group pressure to force conformity with the
existing and expected social ways" that characterizes social intercourse generally (supra note
48 at 65).
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that tends to describe as "best" the set of principles that most clearly fits
existing U.S. constitutional and legal practices, and tends to describe as
"incoherent" anything that challenges or disrupts those practices and
principles, will ultimately fail to grapple with the more difficult and
intractable issues that concern political and social relations. With respect
to Dworkin's analysis of conservative resistance to abortion, this results
in an interpretation that fails to capture and fully engage with the political
vision, in particular its patriarchal features, which animates the pro-life
movement. One is left with the sense that Dworkin's main points rest on
a skillful evasion of how those who disagree with him see the world.
Instead of intellectual confusion, we are presented with intellectual
sleight of hand.
Dworkin's final analytic foray into conservative politics entails an
examination of the Roman Catholic position on abortion.5 Dworkin sets
out to do this as part of a consideration of what he identifies as the two
main institutional players in the abortion debate, religion and feminism,
and as the final step in clearing up the intellectual confusion that
surrounds the debate.
Religious groups have been at the forefront of the anti-abortion
movement in the United States. However, Dworkin, quoting from Bap-
tist, Methodist, and Jewish religious leaders, argues that what is being
articulated is an opposition to abortion based on the sacredness of life
rather than foetal rights or personhood.52 Dworkin does not seem to
consider that rights language is a specifically jurisprudential mode of
understanding social relationships that might have very little to do with
the central preoccupations of religious thinkers. Even so, religious
opposition cannot be so easily reformulated as "detached" from foetal
rights because Roman Catholics, Dworkin concedes, have taken an
explicitly rights based, and therefore extremely inflexible, position on
abortion. Dworkin also concedes that the Roman Catholic Church has
been one of the most prominent and powerful players in the struggle over
abortion. Dworkin is left to argue that the present position of the Church
that the foetus is a person from the moment of conception53 is consistent
neither with the beliefs of most American Catholics nor with its own
historical precedents.
51. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 39-50.
52. Ibid. at 35-39.
53. Ibid. at 39. Dworkin takes the Church's position from the Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (London: Catholic Truth Society,
1987) (ibid. at note 12).
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The most important historical precedent for Roman Catholic thought,
in Dworkin's view, is contained in the theories of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas, on Dworkin's account, did not think that the foetus could have
a rational or intellectual soul until it had developed a human form which
Aquinas claimed occurred at the point of quickening. Dworkin is im-
pressed that Aquinas's notion of foetal growth as a developmental
process with distinct stages rather than simply the enlargement of a tiny,
fully formed human was later confirmed by science. However, Dworkin
points out that science has proved Aquinas wrong on two important
points. Aquinas thought that the father exclusively controlled foetal
growth "acting at a distance through 'froth' in the semen,"54 and that
quickening corresponds with the development of the organic basis of
sentience. Science, Dworkin informs us, has since shown that both
parents contribute chromosomes to the embryo and that the organic basis
of sentience does not develop until, at the earliest, the twenty-sixth week
of gestation, or, roughly, the beginning of the third trimester. Dworkin
relies on the work of a leading embryologist5 for this latter piece of
information and, at various points in his essay, argues that sentience
rather than foetal viability (the criterion proffered in Roe v. Wade)
provides the better scientific basis for the moral and constitutional
importance accorded third trimester pregnancies. Sentience or the ability
to feel pain, Dworkin suggests, falls short of what we mean by personhood
and therefore does not give rise to rights. However, it does give rise to an
interest in not feeling pain. Thus, Aquinas's framework plus a few
adjustments based on contemporary science might "produce a spiritual
version of the main distinction drawn in Roe v. Wade: a fetus has no
human soul, and abortion cannot be considered murder, until approxi-
mately the end of the second trimester of pregnancy. '56 In sum, for
Dworkin, God as revealed by Roman Catholic theology, nature as
revealed by science, and liberalism as revealed by U.S. constitutional law
all yield the same answer.57
54. Ibid. at 41.
55. Ibid. at 17, note 23 quoting from C. Grobstein, Science andthe Unborn (New York: Basic
Books, 1988) at 55, 130.
56. Ibid. at 42.
57. Dworkin deals one final blow to the credibility of the Vatican. The current stance of the
Roman Catholic Church is not only bad theology, but also, Dworkin suggests, politically
motivated. If foetal personhood is established, then abortion prohibitions become a matter of
state as well as Church doctrine, and, in addition, Vatican pronouncements that abortion is a
sin are placed on a distinctly different foundation than the more unpopular Vatican pronounce-
ments that contraception is a sin (ibid. at 45-46).
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II. Incoherent Feminists and Constitutional Privacy Rights
Having cleared up the confusion among conservatives, Dworkin next
turns to the liberal, pro-choice position. He describes the paradigm liberal
position as follows. First, "abortion is always a grave moral decision, at
least from the moment at which the genetic individuality of the fetus is
fixed and it has successfully implanted in the womb, normally after about
fourteen days. 58 Therefore, abortion for trivial or frivolous reasons such
as "a long-awaited European trip"59 is never acceptable. Secondly,
abortion is justified for serious reasons such as saving the life of the
mother, rape, incest, or severe foetal abnormality. Thirdly, a woman's
concern for "permanent and grave"6 consequences to herself or her
family, such as a chance to have f.n education, a career, or a satisfying life,
also justifies abortion. Finally, the state should not intervene to prevent
even morally impermissible abortions until the point in pregnancy when
the foetus is "sufficiently developed to have interests of its own. 61
Clearly, Dworkin points out, this position is inconsistent with foetal
personhood and thus liberals do not believe foetuses have rights. Rather,
the difficulty with the liberal position is in justifying both the moral and
the constitutional limits on individual autonomy which most liberals, on
Dworkin's view, support. For this we need to examine the widely shared
notion that human life is sacred, a task on which Dworkin embarks in
Chapter Three. However, first there is the matter of feminist critiques of
the liberal position on abortion, in particular of the central liberal text in
this regard, namely Roe v. Wade. Feminism, like religion, is a major
institutional player in the abortion debate. Catharine MacKinnon, for the
most part, stands in for American feminism and perhaps for all women in
the world given that the United States, according to Dworkin, has the
world's most powerful women's movement.62 Like the Pope, MacKinnon
is difficult to fit into Dworkin's reconfiguration of the abortion debate.
Dworkin sets out to show that, in general, "feminist arguments and
studies are grounded not just in denying that a fetus is a person or claiming
that abortion is permissible even if it is, but also in positive concerns that
recognize the intrinsic value of human life." 63 In addition, Dworkin
wishes to demonstrate that feminists, such as Catharine MacKinnon, who
58. Ibid. at 32-33.
59. Ibid. at 33.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid. at 6.
63. Ibid. at 50.
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have been "among the most savage critics" 64 of the majority opinion in
Roe v. Wade, advance arguments that are ill-founded and do not make
sense. Thus, feminists not only fail to offer a coherent critique of the
present constitutional status of reproductive rights, they also, like most
liberals, implicitly accept the justification of extensive state constraints
on reproductive rights on the basis of the intrinsic value of foetal life.
Dworkin never fully explains at this stage why it is important to his
account of women's rights to abortion to thoroughly discredit the feminist
critique of Roe v. Wade. Like Dworkin's reasonable liberals, most
feminists in the United States agree that women have a right to abortion.
On reflection, it seems that what is most challenging to Dworkin's
analysis is not the feminist demand for unrestricted access to abortion
with its attendant moral insensitivity to Dworkin's conception of "the
sacred." Rather, the central difficulty for Dworkin is MacKinnon' s claim
that the abortion issue is about the unequal social and political power of
men and women, and not about the acceptable limits on individual
freedom. MacKinnon's analysis is rooted in her critique of the ideologi-
cal and structural features of the liberal state, in particular, the public/
private split. In this regard, she has written:
The state is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint
of male power on the relation between law and society. This stance is
especially vivid in constitutional adjudication, thought legitimate to the
degree it is neutral on the policy content of legislation. The foundation for
its neutrality is the pervasive assumption that conditions that pertain
among men on the basis of gender apply to women as well-that is, the
assumption that sex inequality does not really exist in society. The
Constitution-the constituting document of this state society-with its
interpretations assumes that society, absent government intervention, is
free and equal; that its laws, in general, reflect that; and that government
need and should right only what government has previously wronged.65
In MacKinnon's view, constitutional privacy rights and the negative
notion of liberty on which they are founded abandon women to the
conditions of sexual, racial, and class oppression which coercively shape
their reproductive lives within liberalism's private sphere. For her,
constitutional privacy doctrine is one of the central examples of "the
assumption that sex inequality does not really exist in society. '66 At the
core of MacKinnon's analysis is a claim that sexual intimacy and in
64. Ibid. at51.
65. C.A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1989) at 163.
66. Ibid.
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particular, heterosexual intercourse, has been constructed as free and
consensual when, in fact,
[w]omen feel compelled to preserve the appearance-which, acted upon,
becomes the reality-of male direction of sexual expression, as if it were
male initiative itself that women want, as if it were that which women find
arousing. Men enforce this. It is much of what men want in a woman, what
pornography eroticizes and prostitutes provide.67
The notion that social power can determine the meaning of freedom
and equality, as well as sexual intercourse, is both the most powerful and
(for some feminists concerned with the absence of any place for female
agency within her theories) the most problematic aspect of MacKinnon's
analysis .68 The claim that power and meaning are interconnected is also
extremely threatening to the entire edifice of Dworkin's argument. His
strategy in this essay seems to be to ignore this aspect of MacKinnon's
critique. Indeed, his approach at this juncture is reminiscent of his flat,
dismissive reading of conservative objections to abortion. Gone is the
openness to viewing other theoretical claims expansively, displayed, for
example, by the willingness to link Aquinian discussions of fluttering
spirits and the life force of frothy sperm to larger, transhistorical, and
secular concerns about the sanctity of human life.
Instead, Dworkin adopts aposture of mild exasperation with respect to
MacKinnon's rejection of constitutional privacy doctrine. Dworkin, as
we later find out,69 thinks that Justice Blackmun, the author of the
majority reasons in Roe v. Wade, got it exactly right. Dworkin agrees with
MacKinnon's view that women have very little freedom in the private
sphere because of sexual domination by men but points out that the law
is slowly changing for the better, in some instances because of
MacKinnon's work.70 Therefore, he wonders, should not lack of control
over their bodies make it even more important that women have consti-
tutional recognition of their rights to privacy in sexual matters?
MacKinnon's critique of the way in which "private" heterosexual rela-
tions are shaped to reflect and perpetuate male power and domination
largely disappears from Dworkin's consideration. Rather, he presents her
rejection of Roe v. Wade's support for women's privacy rights as
67. Ibid. at 184-85.
68. For a discussion of the problems raised by MacKinnon's theory of the state and of
heterosexuality, see D. R6aume, "The Social Construction of Women and the Possibility of
Change: Unmodified Feminism Revisited" (1992) 5 C.J.W.L 463.
69. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 168-72. See also infra notes 135-45 and accompanying
text.
70. Ibid. at 52.
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illustrative of her inability to understand that all women need is more
privacy.
MacKinnon is also wrong, Dworkin continues, to attribute the failure
of the state to protect women from marital rape or provide funding for
abortions to the doctrine of constitutional privacy rights. With respect to
marital rape, he alleges that MacKinnon has confused territorial privacy
with privacy in the sense of individual sovereignty. Nothing in the notion
of privacy as individual sovereignty, Dworkin explains with just a hint of
impatience, prevents the state from entering the territorial space of the
home or bedroom to protect women from domestic violence.71 Again,
Dworkin manages to turn MacKinnon' s account, which is focused on the
ideological power of the language of privacy, into a perplexing inability
to understand that the use of the word privacy to denote sovereignty is
coincidental. Ironically, Dworkin's persistent confoundedness in this
regard underscores MacKinnon's main point, namely that "the very
things feminism regards as central to the subjection of women-the very
place, the body; the very relations, heterosexual; the very activities,
intercourse and reproduction; and the very feelings, intimate-form the
core of privacy doctrine's coverage. 72
One way of understanding MacKinnon on Dworkin's terms is to view
her analysis of privacy doctrine as a critique rather than endorsement of
the way social and constitutional practices conflate the notions of self
determination and exclusive occupation of a boundaried space. To this
extent, Dworkin's distinction between the two meanings of privacy is
extremely helpful. However, from MacKinnon's perspective, the cen-
trality of the imagery of the home and the bedroom in judicial elabora-
tions of the meaning of liberty and reproductive autonomy is much more
than coincidental. Nor is it metaphoric in the sense of a figure of speech
that merely implies a comparison between private bedrooms and indi-
vidual sovereignty. Instead, the imagery of the inviolability of private
property constitutes a central cultural narrative about the meaning of
71. Ibid. at 53-54.
72. MacKinnon, supra note 65 at 193.
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autonomy and human freedom.73 MacKinnon's argument is that the
notion of sovereignty as exclusive and boundaried personal space into
which the state may not intrude definitionally excludes women's experi-
ences of lack of autonomy. For MacKinnon, spatial privacy has, in a
sense, captured the meaning of autonomy in a specifically gendered
manner. In addition, autonomy as privacy, defined in opposition to the
public, renders any redefinition of autonomy that requires public respon-
sibility for the social structures of oppression a potential trespass or
violation of boundary.
In sum, Dworkin's analysis of MacKinnon provides an interesting
parallel to his analysis of the conservative pro-life movement. By
overlooking the rhetorical power of the conservative assertion of foetal
rights and personhood, Dworkin fails to fully explore the social and
political vision that underlies that assertion and its implications for
women. By overlooking MacKinnon's critique of the ideological power
of the concept of the private and the attendant imagery of boundary,
bedroom, and exclusive space, Dworkin fails to recognise, much less
73. For an analysis of the symbolic importance of property based notions of freedom, see J.
Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities" in A. Hutchinson
& L. Green, eds., Law and the Community: The End of Individualism? (Toronto: Carswell,
1989) 219. Nedelsky refers to the "rhetorical, even mythical power of the identification of
property with freedom" in political theory and American constitutional rights discourse (ibid.
at 237); see also J. Nedelsky, "Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self' in R. Post, ed., Law
andthe Order of Culture (Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press, 1991) 162 fora discussion
of the way the property-based language of boundary "masks the existence of relationships and
their centrality to concepts like property and privacy" (ibid. at 178). See also H. Lessard,
"Relationship, Particularity, and Change: Reflections on R v. Morgentaler and Feminist
Approaches to Liberty" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 263. Foran analysis of how the Anglo-European
notions of property and exclusive ownership which form the conceptual basis of constitutional
rights perpetuate the cultural domination of First Nations, see M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal
Peoples and the Canadian Charter. Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" (1989-90)
6 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3.
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engage in, an analysis of MacKinnon' s challenge to the way liberal theory
conceptualizes individual freedom and autonomy.74
With respect to MacKinnon's second point, that privacy rights have
turned out to mean that poor women cannot get state funded abortions but
can get state funded pregnancies,75 Dworkin agrees that such a result is
inconsistent with meaningful reproductive rights. However, he insists
that the notion that women have privacy rights makes it more, not less,
likely that governments will ensure that the right is meaningful.7 6 Again,
Dworkin's response to MacKinnon in this regard seems oblivious to her
central claim, namely that the privacy description of liberty assumes
background conditions of social equality thereby rendering government
support for women potentially violative of male privacy rights.
According to Dworkin, the one useful and coherent thing that
MacKinnon has said about the right to privacy is that it obscures the
special nature of pregnancy and the relationship between a pregnant
woman and a foetus by assimilating it to other legal relationships. For
Dworkin this is particularly important because it illuminates "the special
creative role of a woman in pregnancy.... [A]n intense physical and
emotional investment in it unlike that which any other person, even its
father, has.177 Dworkin agrees that describing the woman's interest in
free reproductive choice as a right of personal sovereignty places the
74. MacKinnon's theory of gender oppression has been criticized for its universalization of
the experiences of white women, in particular her failure to take account of race in the
development of theoretical categories and her emphasis on the centrality of sexuality to
women's oppression. See M. Kline, "Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory" (1989) 12
Harv. Women's L.J. 115 and A. Harris, "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory"
(1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581. Indeed, both Dworkin and MacKinnon fail to examine how the
theoretical category of "the private" assumes a race specific experience of privacy and
autonomy. For example, Rhonda Williams has argued that "[clhattel slavery denied black
familial autonomy, and white men's use of rape as a weapon of terror undermined black
women's integrity, forcefully demonstrating the absence of a patriarchally protected 'private
sphere' for black families" (R. Williams, "Race, Deconstruction, and the Emergent Agenda of
Feminist Economic Theory" in M.A. Ferber & J.A. Nelson, eds., Beyond Economic Man
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) 144 at 151). See also infra notes 93-97 and
accompanying text.
75. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) the Court found that a state may refuse financial
aid for abortions while providing aid for childbirth. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
the Court found that the federal government may prohibit the use of medical welfare funds for
medically necessary abortions.
76. Life's Dominion, supra note I at 54. Dworkin comments that, in his view, Harris v.
McRae was wrongly decided, but that the Court's "decision was hardly the result of its having
previously recognised a right of privacy in matters of procreation" (ibid. at 37). See also
Dworkin's analysis of why the abortion funding decisions should perhaps be reconsidered
(ibid. at 175-76).
77. Ibid. at 55.
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abortion decision on the same level as decisions about what clothes to
wear. This ignores "everything special, complex, ironic, and tragic about
pregnancy and abortion.""
Finally, Dworkin gives a surprising reading to MacKinnon' s assertion
that the central issue in abortion is women's substantive equality. This
must mean, suggests Dworkin, that MacKinnon believes that if men and
women were truly equal so that pregnancy was more clearly consented to
by women, "[a]bortion would then more plainly be, as of course many
women now think it is, a kind of self-destruction, a woman destroying
something into which she had mixed herself."7 9 Thus Dworkin reformu-
lates MacKinnon's thesis that abortion is an equality issue into a revela-
tion that women identify with as well as feel oppressed by their pregnan-
cies."o This is reinforced, Dworkin continues, by cultural feminists such
as Robin West who, relying on work by Carol Gilligan, call for a
responsibility rather than rights based argument for abortion. Indeed,
Dworkin concludes, many of the subjects in Gilligan's famous abortion
study talk about the "awful decision" as one which involves balancing her
responsibility to respect the intrinsic value of her own life against her
responsibility to respect the value of foetal life in order to avoid a "grave
moral wrong.""I In the end, the only thing that Dworkin has heard
feminists say that he considers worth listening to is that pregnancy raises
distinct moral issues, and that the abortion decision is mostly about
responsibility to care for oneself and others. Ultimately, Dworkin main-
tains that Roe v. Wade's trimester framework appropriately reflects the
moral significance of pregnancy and, as well, allows the incorporation of
notions of moral responsibility into the analysis of rights. This latter point
turns out to mean, not that pregnant women should be respected as
responsible moral actors, but that the state should monitor and structure
the abortion choice in order to ensure that pregnant women act
responsibly.12
Much of feminist work on the issue of abortion, in particular the work
of MacKinnon, requires a fundamental rethinking of the concept of
liberty as privacy and of the social and institutional structures within
which constitutional liberty claims are defined and enforced. However,
Dworkin's "constructive" interpretation of MacKinnon never explores
the breadth of that challenge.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid. at 56.
80. Ibid. at 57.
81. Ibid. at60.
82. Ibid. at 151-54, 173-76. See the discussion of Dworkin's notion of the state's role as
guardian of the public moral space, infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
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II. Siberian Tigers and Exotic Birds: Dworkin's Map of the Sacred
Chapter Three is called "What is Sacred?" Having established that all
reasonable people, including feminists and most Roman Catholics, not
only reject foetal personhood but also implicitly accept restrictions on
abortion access, Dworkin enters into the task of explaining the moral
underpinnings of this position which turn out to be rooted in the "familiar
but widely misunderstood idea of the sacred."3 Sacredness, inDworkin' s
lexicon, is about intrinsic value. The vitriolic rhetoric of some conserva-
tive pro-life groups is really about this notion of intrinsic value, as is the
liberal position that some constraints on abortion access are appropriate.
Intrinsic value, Dworkin continues, is distinct from both instrumental
value (things that are important because they are useful to us) and
personal value (things that are important to us because, as individuals, we
desire and enjoy them). Art, culture, and knowledge are examples of
things, other than human life, that most people think of as intrinsically
valuable. Dworkin suggests that most people feel the same way about
human life. Since a foetus has no interests, it cannot have subjective or
personal value. However it can and does have intrinsic value. In addition,
some things, for example the life of Mozart, can be simultaneously
instrumentally, personally, and intrinsically valuable.
"The sacred" includes some things that are incrementally valuable in
the sense that it is always better to have more of them, like knowledge, and
things which are not, like art and human life. The latter, once they exist,
are sacred or inviolable. However, we do not want as much of them as
possible. Therefore, rules or norms which promote or enforce childbearing
are not morally required and, in fact, may not make moral sense given
concerns about over population. In clarifying that quantity of human life
is not morally important, Dworkin makes the point that most of us think
that some lives, like some artworks, are, of course, more important than
others. Thus, we might want more Leonardos, but not more Tintorettos.
However, once inferior art is in existence, we treasure it and would be
horrified at its destruction.' Similarly, although we are especially troubled
when "complex and interesting cultures" are destroyed or threatened, this
is not because of the excitement of cultural variety but because the
destruction of any artistic form developed by humans is a "terrible
desecration."85 Thus we treasure "some form of primitive art," traditional
crafts, and aspects of popular and industrial culture, not simply because
83. Ibid. at 25.
84. Ibid. at 74.
85. Ibid. at 72.
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we think the objects "splendid or beautiful," but because "it seems a great
waste" if these imaginative forms entirely disappear." Dworkin suggests
that most of these intuitions about "the sacred" can be rationally ex-
plained. He concedes that some things are considered sacred by a culture
simply because they have been designated as such, like the American
flag. However, he points out that other things become sacred because of
the process which brings them into being. Indeed, in Dworkin's view, the
process of generation rather than its result is the "nerve of the sacred." 7
Furthermore, the importance given to the process of generation is rational
because it is grounded in a respect for the investment, natural or human,
that has taken place. Art, for example, is sacred because it comes into
existence through the process of human creation. There is a human
investment at stake. Species, as distinct from individual members of
species, are considered sacred because they come into being through the
process of evolution. There is a natural investment at stake. It follows
logically that the human species is particularly sacred and its survival
particularly important because it embodies both processes of generation,
human and natural. Its destruction would violate the sanctity of the
cultural and artistic products of human creation as well as the extensive
investment of nature in the development of a species which is the most
evolved of all species. 8
As I have previously suggested, Dworkin's refusal to acknowledge
any relation between social power and knowledge has resulted in very
narrow and sometimes simplified portrayals of both conservative and
feminist claims. I have also suggested that the refusal can be explained,
at least in part, by his constructive approach to interpretation. The claims
of other theorists are given the interpreter's "best" interpretation in
accordance with the principles and practices that are shared within the
community. However, in Chapter Three, Dworkin develops his own
"best" account of the intricate structure of moral intuitions in a way that
uncritically accepts the political neutrality of such categories as "the
natural" and "the human." His suggestion that nature can be regarded as
some sort of Investor whose expenditures have created the status quo and
are therefore entitled to respect is particularly problematic. It combines
the culturally powerful imagery of the market with the equally powerful
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid. at 78.
88. Dworkin explains that the intrinsic value of the human species, however, does not give
rise to a commitment to the future existence of particular individuals. Thus, it is inappropriate
to speak of the rights of future generations. It does give rise, however, to a commitment to the
survival of the species and to leaving a fair share of natural and cultural resources (ibid. at 77).
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notion that an ordering principle, immanent in the material universe,
gives meaning to and structures the universe of social relations. Thus,
principles of economic rationality mirror the divine/natural order which
in turn informs social and moral relations. Dworkin makes it clear that it
is not necessary to view nature as having conscious intent in order to
believe that its processes are sacred. One can base inviolability on the idea
that "even unconscious natural processes of creation should be treated as
investments worthy of respect."89
Nature is never defined in Dworkin's discussion but simply posed in
opposition to the human, or more specifically, to human consciousness.
Human consciousness in this scheme becomes disembodied. Its value
lies in its god-like transcendence of nature through the activity of
choosing, designing, and planning. The human body is sanctified as part
of the natural order which, in turn, can be viewed either as divine in the
religious sense or as a set of investments which render the natural order
rational simply because they have happened. In addition, to complete the
picture, scientific knowledge, which is unmediated by social configura-
tions of power, gives us more and more marvelous information about the
natural order. Science reveals nature in much the way holy texts reveal the
divine.
This view of the relationship between nature, society, and scientific
knowledge has, up until this point, provided the unexplored background
for Dworkin's essay. It gets left out of, or skipped over, in his discussion
of feminist theory and conservative politics because it does not fit with a
constructive interpretation of the abortion debate. For example, in order
to show that feminists and conservatives share a large area of agreement
with respect to the sanctity of foetal life, Dworkin must downplay or
avoid mention of the way in which the conservative discourse of foetal
personhood and the medical discourse of foetal patienthood inform and
reinforce each other, and, furthermore, how both discourses render the
subordination of women in the area of reproduction an obvious and
inevitable feature of the natural order. In Chapter Three, Dworkin's
seeming obliviousness to the ideological underpinnings of distinctions
like natural versus human, mind versus body, and primitive versus
complex cultures, is thrust into the foreground. His presentation of the
order of creation as both divine and rational is especially troubling
because the boundary between the natural and the human has traditionally
been drawn in ways which are starkly ideological. Women, members of
racialized groups, and the poor have typically been placed on the nature
89. Ibid. at 79.
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side of the divide because of what is portrayed as their natural deficiencies
or inferiority, or their biological destinies.90
In particular, the depiction of human reproduction as a wholly natural,
biological, and essentially female process has often served to obscure its
political meanings. As Virginia Held has written in her analysis of the
differential and gendered construction of birth and death within political
theory: "That women give birth is said to make them "essentially" close
to nature, resembling other mammals in this important and possibly
dominant aspect of their lives."9' The identification of women with
nature, the body, and reproduction is invoked to legitimize conceptions
of political organization within which women are naturally relegated to
the private sphere of the household and to the task of species reproduction
while "[i]n the male realm of the polis, it is thought, men risk death for
the sake of human progress."92 However, the concept of nature also serves
to conceal theoretical contradictions. For example, under slavery, the
private task of species reproduction referred to by Held becomes the
public task for enslaved women of "replenish[ing] the master's capital
assets."93 Similarly, within contemporary liberalism, the ideal of private
female domesticity and motherhood obscures the experiences of women
who are members of racialized groups and poor women who dispropor-
tionately have their children appropriated for a white, middle class
90. R. Williams, supra note 74, describes the way in which nineteenth century natural
historians generated a set of oppositions including culture versus nature, civil versus savage
which "legitimated race as a meaningful categorization of our species" and "provided a
foundation for modem racism" (ibid. at 145). L.C. Ikemoto, "The Code of Perfect Pregnancy:
At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and
the Interventionist Mindset of Law" (1992) 53 Ohio St. L.J. 1205, describes motherhood as
"color-coded, class-coded, and culture-coded" (ibid. at 1207). See also M. Kline, "Complicat-
ing the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation Women" (1993) 18
Queen's L.J. 306 [hereinafter "Ideology of Motherhood"].
91. V. Held, "Birth and Death" in C. R. Sunstein, ed., Feminism and Political Theory
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 87 at 89.
92. Ibid.
93. D. Roberts, "The Genetic Tie" (1995) 62 U. Chicago L. Rev. at 29 [forthcoming, cited
to 3/30/94 draft].
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market in babies94 and gestational services.95 In these contexts, the
legitimizing authority of the concept of nature is invoked, on the one
hand, to "resolve the contradiction between slavery and liberty" 96 by
reference to the natural superiority of the white race and, on the other
hand, to suppress the racial sub-text of the "gender mythology" 97 of a
natural separation between the private sphere of family and the public
sphere of the market. Rather than confronting the complex ideological
uses and political meanings of the concept of nature within moral and
political theory, Dworkin presents us with-another symbolic vocabulary,
"Nature as Investor" and "the sacred" as a calculus of the value of
investments. Furthermore, the overlay of the natural and the divine with
the market imagery of investment does not simply add to the available
cultural imagery of reproduction. Rather, it, in itself, functions ideologi-
cally by suggesting that the relations of power which shape the human
experience of birth andreproduction are analogous to the interactions and
outcomes of freely negotiated exchange relations. Thus the social struc-
tures that organize reproduction become simultaneously natural, free,
and rational.
There is a final refinement which Dworkin wishes to add to his map of
"the sacred" before turning to the specific issue of the value of the foetus,
94. See G. Pascall, "Adoption: Perspectives in Social Policy" in P. Bean, ed., Adoption:
Essays in Social Policy, Law, and Sociology (London: Tavistock 1984) 9; Community Panel,
Child Protection Legislation Review in British Columbia& Aboriginal Committee, Liberating
Our Children, Liberating Our Nations: Report of the Aboriginal Committee, Community
Panel, ChildProtection Legislation Review in British Columbia (Victoria, B.C.: The Commit-
tee, 1992); "Ideology of Motherhood," supra note 90.
95. D. Roberts writes that "gestational surrogacy invokes the possibility that white middle-
class couples will use women of color to gestate their babies. Since contracting couples need
notbe concerned about the surrogate's genetic qualities (most importantly, her race), they may
favor hiring the most economically vulnerable women in order to secure the lowest price for
their services" (supra note 93 at 85).
96. Ibid. at 26. Roberts writes: "Racial ideology explained domination by one group over
another as the manner in which societies were naturally organized. Blacks were biologically
destined to be slaves and whites destined to be their masters. Whites created the hereditary trait
of race and endowed it with the concept of racial superiority and inferiority in order to resolve
the contradiction between slavery and liberty" (ibid.).
97. Williams, supra note 74 at 152. In this regard, Williams states:
Thus the animating economy/family dualism anchors gender, but in a racialized
fashion. The animating gender mythology of public vs. private spheres suppresses the
ideological and material racialization of gender. For most of [the United State's]
history, institutionalized and personally violent white racism has truncated the private
sphere of black family life in particular and that of people of color more generally. For
Native American and Puerto Rican communities, state welfare and judicial policies
have historically threatened rather than supported the creation of autonomous private
life." (ibid.)
See also "Ideology of Motherhood," supra note 90.
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namely the idea that there are degrees of "the sacred." Siberian tigers are
more valuable than exotic birds. Pit vipers and sharks are very low on the
scale. Bellini is clearly above minor Renaissance artists. Some things are
completely off the chart, like insects (even benign insects), and viruses
and cars and coal and cows.9 Dworkin concedes that these hierarchies of
"the sacred" may be entirely superstitious. However, he believes that they
reveal in an important way a structure of thought which we can apply to
the difficult moral question of abortion. In other words, although the
actual hierarchies may be fanciful, the idea of hierarchy is significant and
pertinent. Again, Dworkin's confidence in the reasonableness of what are
increasingly questionable assertions about the sacred order of nature
precludes any exploration of the way in which such views frequently
emerge as justifications for hierarchies of privilege based on "natural"
differences such as race, gender, sexuality, and ability.
The groundwork has now been laid for Dworkin's discussion of
abortion. In his view, abortion raises the question of the sanctity of
individual human lives. Dworkin suggests that each individual human
life is sacred for the same reasons that the survival of the human species
is important and sacred. Each human being is the result of both a natural
creative process and a human creative process. Dworkin goes out of his
way to show why, on both counts, the natural and the human, the process
which creates individual humans is different from the process that creates
individual members of other species. First of all, the natural process is
different because if one is religious, one believes that humans are made
in the image of God. Thus each person is a representation of the divine.
The secular version of this belief is that humans are the pinnacle of
creation. Dworkin suggests that it follows that individual members of the
human species are sacred. 99 The inference, based on the investment
imagery, is that so much more is invested in the human species than any
other species that each human individual acquires value.
Another consequence, in Dworkin's view, of the natural basis of the
inviolability of human individuals is that the chronological marker for
that sacredness is the point at which the human embryo acquires a genetic
identity.I°° Unfortunately this claim is not developed. I would guess that
Dworkin considers it too obvious to explain. However, I think that it is
worth exploring what might underlie the assumption that genetic differ-
98. Life's Dominion, supra note I at 80.
99. Ibid. at 82.
100. Ibid. at 83.
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entiation between cells is so unquestionably important. One might infer
from Dworkin's preceding discussion that this is the point at which the
human cells begin to resemble God or, for the non-religious, take on the
characteristics of the pinnacle of creation. I would like to suggest that an
equally plausible explanation is provided by what R.C. Lewontin has
called "genomania" whereby "[e]very physical, psychic, or social ill,
every perturbation of the body corporeal or politic is said to be genetic."10'
The scientific, philosophical, and legal importance given to genetic
characteristics has been the subject of a number of critiques which are
particularly germane to any discussion of the social meaning of abortion
and human reproduction. These critiques are interesting both on their
own and in terms of the contradictions they reveal, when taken together,
in the uses of the concept of the genetic individual. For example, R.C.
Lewontin suggests that, generally, "much of the 'evidence' for basic
biological differences determining differential abilities and roles turns
out to confuse observations with their causes and explanations."'' 02 An
example is Mary O'Brien's argument that the observed genetic link
between fathers and their children has been used as the causal explanation
for the political concept of paternity and to legitimize a wide range of
social practices, including marriage and the social isolation of women
from the society of men, in order to ensure security for paternal claims. 103
O'Brien points out that because, from the male perspective, the genetic
tie is for the most part an idea, men have the choice of acknowledging it
or not. 4
Dorothy Roberts' work completes O'Brien' s account by revealing the
historical and social specificity of the link between the genetic tie and
paternity. In Roberts' view, the social importance given to "the value of
the genetic tie is rooted in scientific racism, which understands racial
variation as an important, biological human distinction that determines
superiority and inferiority."'1 5 Furthermore, the "choice" of whether or
not to acknowledge paternity becomes irrelevant in the context of
slavery, given a set of social rules that reverses the usual meaning of the
101. R.C.Lewontin, "Women Versus the Biologists" The New YorkReview ofBooks (7 April
1994) 31 at 31. See also A. Lippman, "Worrying-And Worrying About-the Geneticization
of Reproduction and Health" in G. Basen, M. Eichler& A. Lippman, eds., Misconceptions: The
Social Construction of Choice and the New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies (Hull:
Voyageur, 1993) 39.
102. Lewontin, ibid. at 34.
103. M. O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) at
53-55.
104. Ibid. at 52.
105. Roberts, supra note 93 at 24.
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genetic tie. Instead of "the patriarchal tenet that the social status of the
child must follow the male line," under slavery the children of white men
and their female slaves automatically took on the slave status of their
mothers."°6 In sum, interpretations of genetic characteristics provide an
example of the way descriptive information about nature is deployed in
often contradictory ways by patriarchal and white supremacist norms. By
presenting as self explanatory the notion that genetic differentiation
between cells is morally significant, Dworkin's discussion further sub-
merges rather than interrogates the connections between scientific infor-
mation about the genetic basis of human life and political and social
domination.
Dworkin's analysis of the human investment in the human individual
raises additional problems. As noted above, Dworkin postulates that
nature's investment in pregnancy begins when genetic individuation in
the cell matter that makes up the embryo occurs. He pinpoints this at
roughly fourteen days after conception."°7 The human investment, it turns
out, takes the form of planning to become a parent-not the embodied
work of pregnancy-but rather the disembodied act of choosing and
making a decision. Dworkin describes the creative aspect of reproductive
choice as follows: "The second form of sacred creation, the human as
distinct from the natural investment, is also immediate when pregnancy
is planned, because a deliberate decision of parents to have and bear a
child is of course a creative one. ''los Although articulated in gender
neutral language, this creative human activity of planning parenthood
turns out to be implicitly male. The female "choice" seems to flow from
being pregnant, rather than from deciding to be pregnant. Furthermore,
given that the human for Dworkin is defined in opposition to nature and
to the body, it is unclear whether being pregnant, as opposed to deciding
to be pregnant, fits within the human or the natural side of the investment
account. Dworkin describes pregnancy as "an intense physical and
emotional investment ... unlike that which any other person, even its
father, has."1 9 Indeed, Dworkin makes much ofpregnancy's specialness,
but in a way that implies the need for significant control and monitoring
of female procreative autonomy. 1°
106. Ibid. at 22.
107. Life's Dominion, supra note I at 89.
108. bid. at 83.
109. Ibid. at 55.
110. See the discussion of Dworkin's critique of feminism, supra notes 77-82 and accom-
panying text.
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The female creative choice in the sense that Dworkin understands
human creativity-namely in terms of transcending nature and biology
and autonomously planning alife that does or does not include children-
if it occurs at all in Dworkin's scheme, does so at the point of heterosexual
intercourse. Once pregnant, or at least fourteen days after conception,
women's procreative autonomy is complicated by the external invest-
ments in the foetal life she carries. Liberals according to Dworkin will
nevertheless respect the choices of women to terminate their pregnancies
until the later months of pregnancy. However, even within the liberal
vision, the compounding investments of nature plus any investment that
the father chooses to make together act as a sacred constraint on women's
choices, inevitably casting them as morally suspect and irrational
squanderers of the fortunes of others. Admittedly, Dworkin strains to
think of reasons, such as career goals or family responsibilities, that might
explain the decision to terminate a pregnancy as the rational outcome of
a kind of moral cost-benefit calculation. However, the assumed opposi-
tion between women and their foetuses remains definitive, and at a certain
point in time, it is the other investments that are more important and that
explain and give moral authority to Roe v. Wade's trimester framework.
This leaves heterosexual intercourse as the only point in Dworkin's
scheme where women are as fully human, on Dworkin's terms, as men
with regard to the pursuit of procreative happiness. Dworkin comes
closest to examining the way in which the politics of heterosexual
intercourse might compromise women's reproductive autonomy in his
discussion of MacKinnon. There he describes as "arresting"" 1 the femi-
nist argument that abortion cannot be treated as simply about the
"intrinsic importance of a new human life" because "pregnancy is too
often the result not of creative achievement but of uncreative subordina-
tion, and because the costs of pregnancy and child-rearing are so unfairly
distributed, falling so heavily and disproportionately on [women]. 112
However, Dworkin concludes that this argument "may be overstated""' 3
because, among other things, "[it] takes no notice of the creative function
of the father.""' 4 Thus, in Dworkin's overall analysis, the nature of the
female creative investment remains vague and ambiguous at best.
Dworkin continues his account of the creative human choices that
constitute the human investment in individuals in terms of the myriad
individual choices that shape the cultural and social context into which a
111. Ibid.at56.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
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child is born, as well as the child's own choices and decisions. Again, the
work of child care does not figure in Dworkin' s map of the sacred. Rather,
the story of the human investment turns out to be a paean to the
transcendence of the human spirit which soars above the daily work of
care, and the closest analogue of which is the notion of artistic genius. The
material supports for that transcendence are nowhere to be seen. The
result is that individuals are like paintings, or, as Dworkin puts it, "[a]
mature woman... [is] something like a work of art."'15
Having established, at least to his own satisfaction, that foetal life is
sacred, Dworkin now embarks on the difficult task of analysing how we
should view abortion. First he reminds us that not only do liberals and
conservatives agree that abortion is morally problematic, but they also
agree that it is worse in some circumstances than in others. The key to
calibrating the degrees of awfulness turns out to be the idea of the
frustration of an investment. Because the investments are made by nature,
the persons themselves, and other persons, the calculation of frustration
with respect to each individual life is far from straightforward. The
premature death of a young woman in a plane crash seems much more
tragic than the premature death of an old man because the latter has, by
and large, realized on his own and society's investment. The former has
not. 16 However, it also makes sense to treat a late term abortion as
morally worse than a early term abortion because as soon as genetic
individuation occurs, "the natural investment that would be wasted in an
abortion grows steadily larger and more significant."'" 7 Dworkin sug-
gests that "[m]ost people's sense of that tragedy, if it were rendered as a
graph relating the degree of tragedy to the age at which death occurs,
would slope upward from birth to some point in late childhood or early
adolescence, then follow aflat line until at least very early middle age, and
then slope down again toward extreme old age."' 8
The concern about wasting an investment is another area of common-
ality between liberals and conservatives. The commonality breaks down
around the question of whether annihilation or death is the most serious
waste of any investment in human life (the conservative view) or whether,
in some circumstances, other kinds of frustration such as poverty or
physical disability are worse (the liberal view). The divergence, Dworkin
explains, reflects the conservative emphasis on the natural mode of
115. Ibid. at 82. Dworkin clarifies that he does not mean that individuals are literally like
paintings. Individuals have moral rather than aesthetic value (ibid.).
116. Ibid. at 86.
117. Ibid. at 89.
118. Ibid. at 87.
254 The Dalhousie Law Journal
creative investment and the liberal emphasis on the human mode. 119 The
most extreme conservative position is that abortion is neverjustified, that
the frustration of the natural investment always outweighs the frustration
of the human investment. A more moderate and typical conservative
position is that in cases where the life of the pregnant woman is
endangered or where the pregnancy is the result of rape, the human
investment outweighs the natural investment.
Dworkin' s discussion of the rape exception is worth further investiga-
tion as yet another instance of the way his interpretive approach tends to
avoid rather than directly engage with competing analyses of an issue.
The rape exception, according to Dworkin, is endorsed by "every
prominent religion" 120 because it is a "deliberate frustration of God's
investment in life." ' To this effect, Dworkin quotes from Rabbi David
Feldman's account of Jewish law as follows: "Abortion for rape victims
would be allowed, using a field and seed analogy: involuntary implanta-
tion of the seed imposes no duty to nourish the alien seed." 22 Dworkin has
evidently read Rabbi Feldman's field and alien seed parable as an
indicator of the moral importance given to women's autonomy by
prominent religions. God in this story is somehow making His invest-
ments through the choices of women. However, the parable more easily
lends itself to the traditional view of rape, namely that itis male ownership
of the field that has been violated by rape, not the field's autonomy. After
all, any seeds are "alien" from the field's perspective. Only from the
planter's perspective is there a distinction between one's own and alien
seeds. The question for the field is whether the seed is invited or not.
Indeed, characterizing women as fields seems to make it clear that they
have neither perspectives, choices, nor questions. None of this is re-
marked upon by Dworkin who simply presents the religious view as one
of the many cultural. modes within which the sacredness of foetal life is
recognised and calculated in investment terms.
The liberal exceptions to the prohibition against abortion are much
more extensive than those of conservatives because of the greater
importance given to human investments in life, both the life of the
potential child and the mother's life. Thus, a potential life that will have
to deal with extreme poverty or severe disabilities is a life that is,
according to many liberals, so frustrated that it is "intrinsically a bad
119. Ibid.at9l.
120. Ibid. at 95.
121. Ibid. at 96.
122. Ibid., quoting from the testimony of Rabbi David Feldman in McRae v. Caiffano, 491
F.Supp. 630 (E.D. N.Y. 1980) at 696.
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thing."'13 Dworkin denies that this view has any connection to eugenics
because, at the stage of gestation when abortion takes place, one is not
dealing with a rights bearing person. 24 In other words, this stance does not
translate into a policy thatpersons who are extremely poor or have severe
disabilities would be better dead.
Again, Dworkin's confidence in the objective coherence of notions of
personhood and rights ignores the ideological function of eugenic theo-
ries and the way they inform expectations of genetically perfect babies as
well as socially perfect communities. Dorothy Roberts suggests that the
"chief danger" of eugenic policies is "not the physical annihilation of a
race or social class; it is the legitimation of an oppressive social hierar-
chy."'15 In this regard, she writes:
Researchers claim to have discovered not only the genetic origins of
medical conditions, but also biological explanations for social conditions.
Policymakers increasingly enlist biology to explain human problems that
result from social inequalities and to dismiss the need for social change.
The Bush Administration, for example, embarked on a "violence initia-
tive" engaged in biological research on crime, premised on the theory that
criminality has a biochemical or genetic cause. The research project was
to find a genetic marker that would identify children at high risk of
becoming criminals and then deter their criminal behaviour through
pharmacological treatment and other therapies."2
Dworkin describes liberal exceptions to the abortion prohibition that
are comparatively generous and flexible. However, the exceptions are
calculated in accordance with a measure of value that takes as given the
background conditions of inequality and which may, itself, perpetuate the
notion that those conditions are "natural" misfortunes which can be
scientifically avoided or cured. Indeed, the same observation pertains
more generally to Dworkin's map of "the sacred." While it carefully and
usefully plots out the ways in which members of liberal societies tend to
think about intrinsic value, it assumes that those conceptions, as well as
their incorporation into legal and constitutional structures, are unmedi-
ated by social and political expectations, experiences, and interests.
123, Dworkin, ibid. at 98.
124. Ibid.
125. Roberts, supra note 93 at 41-42.
126. Ibid. at 22-23.
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IV. Placing Roe v. Wade on the Map of the Sacred
One of the purposes of Dworkin's careful charting of the sacred is to
explain why the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of
reproductive rights makes good liberal sense. The majority in Roe v.
Wade held that states may prohibit abortion after the second trimester of
pregnancy unless abortion is necessary to preserve the mother's life or
health. In Chapter Four, Dworkin explains that Roe v. Wade's holding
that the state has a compelling interest in third trimester pregnancies is not
derived from the notion that the foetus is a person with rights. Dworkin
proceeds by claiming that foetal personhood, the basis of a derivative
responsibility, is inconsistent with both general principles of legal prac-
tice and established moral views. This is ground that has for the most part
already been covered in the chapters on the intellectual confusion of
conservatives. It is no surprise to find that, in Dworkin's view, the U.S.
Supreme Court agrees that a foetus has no rights.
Chapter Five returns to his assertion at the start of Chapter Four that the
majority in Roe v. Wade correctly found that women do indeed have
reproductive rights, and correctly based that finding on a constitutional
privacy interest. Dworkin also uses this chapter as an occasion to critique
arguments, in particular those of Robert Bork, that the U.S. Bill of Rights
should be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the original intent
of its specific historical authors. On this originalist view, Roe v. Wade is
wrong because the authors of the due process clause did not intend to
create a right of privacy. The liberal alternative to originalism is to treat
the Constitution not as a collection of specific historical views but as a set
of abstract moral standards to which judges and statesmen must give the
best meaning in concrete circumstances. The choice between interpretive
approaches, Dworkin tells us, is between a constitution of principle and
a constitution of detail.127 The former is exhilarating, noble, and inevita-
bly controversial; the latter is a safer "postage-stamp collection"'128
approach to the "most striking and original feature" of the "oldest and
most stable structure of government in the world."' 129
It is not difficult to guess what the right answer is. Dworkin concedes
that the postage stamp collection approach is touted as more democratic
and less reliant on a powerful judiciary. However, Dworkin asserts that
because legal analysis supports the principled noble view, it must be
viewed as "law" and all other claims as based on "politics." Furthermore,
127. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 119.
128. Ibid. at 122.
129. Ibid. at 118.
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history and the imitation of the U.S. constitutional model "in Paris and
Bonn and Rome, in New Delhi and Strasbourg and Ottawa, even, perhaps,
in the Palace of Westminster 130 demonstrates that a constitution of
principle is a "precondition of legitimate democracy."'31 Dworkin ex-
horts Americans, and presumably their imitators, to embrace the consti-
tution of principle and place limits on the power ofjudges by insisting that
judges subject themselves to the intellectual discipline of integrity.
Dworkin identifies three components of integrity for Supreme Court
judges in the context of U.S. constitutional adjudication as follows:
reliance on principle rather than political compromise, consistency with
"principles embedded in Supreme Court precedent and with the main
structures of [American] constitutional arrangement,"13 2 and consistency
with the principles endorsed in the judge's decisions in other cases.133
The upshot of Chapter Five is that Justice Blackmun's finding in Roe
v. Wade that women have constitutional rights of privacy is supported by
the best interpretation possible of the abstract guarantee of due process
consistent with requirements of integrity. Finally, the reader understands
Dworkin's persistently flat and oversimplified analysis of MacKinnon's
critique of privacy doctrine. The best or most constructive interpretation
possible of Supreme Court cases entails the worst-in the sense of the
most restrictive-reading possible of any of the critics of "the principles
embedded in Supreme Court precedent and the main structures of
[American] constitutional arrangements.' 13 4
Chapter Six deals with the more difficult questions for liberal justifi-
cation of why, notwithstanding women's personhood and rights of
procreative autonomy, it is constitutionally permissible for states to
significantly compromise and, at a certain point, prevent women's access
to abortion. In particular, the post-Roe v. Wade decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States have allowed states to impose waiting periods
on women seeking abortions'35 and to subsidize the cost for poor women
of pregnancy while refusing to subsidize the cost of an abortion.3 6
Furthermore, Roe v. Wade itself held that states have a compelling
interest in women's pregnancies which permits states to forbid abortions
in the third trimester of pregnancy.
130. Ibid. at 123.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid. at 146.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992)
[hereinafter Casey].
136. Harris v. McRae, supra note 75.
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The starting point for Dworkin's justification is the state's "detached"
responsibility for human life. Indeed, he suggests that "detached" respon-
sibility for intrinsic value justifies a wide range of liberal state action to
protect art, culture, and the environment. 3 7 However, state action to
protect foetal life is different. The key difference is that our views on
abortion are more fundamental to our moral personalities than our views
on cultural survival, protecting habitats, or preserving endangered spe-
cies. Abortion, for Dworkin, is about the horror of our own insignifi-
cance. 138 In this way, beliefs about abortion, are essentially religious
beliefs, even for those who are not religious believers, because religion
is a traditional way of answering existential questions about the meaning
of human life. The fundamentally moral character of the abortion debate
provides an additional justification for state intervention, namely the
traditional role of the American state in protecting the "public moral
space."' 13 9 This added reason is important because, unlike most state
action to protect the environment or art, state action in this regard is going
to significantly limit the fundamental constitutional rights of women. So,
finally, we get to the crux of the matter, namely tradition versus women's
freedom, or more particularly, moral and political traditions versus free
but immoral women. Tradition wins.
Dworkin endeavours to carefully limit and constrain the way the state
in its role as guardian of morals may interfere with reproductive freedom.
For example, he suggests that because the sanctity of foetal life is a highly
contested value, the state's traditional role as moral guardian is most
appropriately conceived of in terms of a state goal of ensuring that its
citizens act in morally responsible ways rather than a state goal of moral
conformity, namely imposing a particular moral view on citizens. Other-
wise, one would have to concede that a state might justifiably coerce
abortion as the appropriate way to respect the human investment, for
example in the case of severely deformed foetuses.140 However, in
Dworkin's view, the guardianship role does permit the state to impose
conditions on access to abortion which are aimed at ensuring that
pregnant women take their moral responsibilities toward foetal life
seriously. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,'14 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state requirement that at least
twenty-four hours before performing an abortion, physicians provide
137. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 149.
138. Ibid. at 156.
139. Ibid. at 150.
140. Ibid. at 159.
141. Supra note 135.
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women with extensive prescribed information about the procedure and
the status of the foetus. Dworkin argues that Casey's holding should be
understood in terms of the state's moral guardianship. Although he
suggests that the Pennsylvania requirements, in fact, did not meet the
criterion formulated by the Casey majority, namely whether the require-
ment constitutes an "undue burden" by posing "substantial obstacles" to
abortion for women, 42 he is otherwise supportive of the test and its
underlying principle.14 1
The final, and perhaps most difficult, question for liberal justification
concerns the specific features of Roe v. Wade's trimester framework for
limiting access to abortion. Dworkin has established that the claim that
women have a constitutional right to procreative autonomy is supported
by U.S. constitutional law and the principle of integrity. He has also
established that the state has a traditional, albeit specially formulated,
interest in limiting procreative autonomy in the name of sanctity of life
and guarding the public moral space. The remaining issue is whether Roe
v. Wade's trimester framework correctly balances these two commit-
ments, both in terms of liberal moral principles and in terms of U.S.
constitutional principles and practices.
Dworkin offers three reasons why Roe v. Wade is correct. First,
science reveals that the end of the sixth month of gestation is the
approximate point when foetal sentience develops.1 44 Thus at this stage,
foetuses, although they do not have rights, have interests in much the way
animals do. Roe v. Wade mistakenly identified foetal viability as the
morally significant biological event. Fortunately, foetal sentience can be
substituted without disrupting the trimester framework and, perhaps,
linking it to a more stable marker than viability, given that medical
technology continues to shift viability back into the earlier months of
pregnancy. Secondly, after six months, the natural and human invest-
ments in the pregnancy have compounded. 145 Evidently, the human
investment, since it is opposed to that of the mother, is that of the father-
creator. Alternatively, women are being called to account because of their
own investments. 146 Thirdly, women have had plenty of time to weigh the
various investments in their lives and bodies and make up their minds.147
142. Ibid. at 2820.
143. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 153-54, 172-76.
144. Ibid. at 169.
145. Ibid. at 170.
146. See the discussion of human creative investment in foetal life in terms of what I suggest
is the implicitly gendered notion of planning parenthood, supra notes 107-14 and accompa-
nying text.
147. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 169-70.
260 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Thus, once more, science, morality and the U.S. Constitution all support
the Roe v. Wade trimester framework. Admittedly, most women who
seek abortions do so well before the third trimester.1 4 However, Roe v.
Wade's trimester framework has significant and widespread implications
as the justification for state regulation of the behaviour and activities of
pregnant women. The most extreme example is the use of Roe v. Wade
to justify the unconsented to surgery which may have hastened Angela
Carder's death in the interests of "fetal survival." 49 More typically, the
notion of a state interest in foetal life provides the justification for the
detention or surveillance of pregnant women whose behaviour or lifestyle
is thought to endanger the health of the foetus, 50 as well as for the
imposition of medical procedures in less extreme situations than that of
Carder.1 5 1
V. Conclusion
Life's Dominion provides a useful guide to the way in which abortion is
understood within liberal democratic societies and within the constitu-
tional law and public discourse of both Canada and the United States. In
addition, Dworkin's analysis gives tremendous authority to Roe v. Wade
at a time when its holding that women have a large measure of reproduc-
tive autonomy in the first six months of pregnancy is under siege from
both pro-life groups and judicial interpretations of the extent of that
autonomy. However, apart from the authority which Dworkin, at the
same time, gives to the limits imposed on women's autonomy by Roe v.
Wade's trimester framework and, to a certain extent, by the post-Roe v.
Wade cases, his discussion presents a number of problems for feminist
analyses and political goals in the area of reproduction.
At the most fundamental level, his refusal to acknowledge that
intuitions about what is intrinsically valuable are in any way shaped by
social power inevitably leaves out the perspectives of those who seriously
lack social power. In particular, he presents notions such as human
freedom and "the sacred" outside the context of stratified and politically
148. K. Luker, Taking Chances: Abortion and the Decision Not to Contracept (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1978) at 174.
149. In re A.C. (D.C. 1987), supra note 16 at 613. See also supra notes 16-32 and
accompanying text.
150. See T.B. Dawson, "Re Baby R: A Comment on Fetal Apprehension" (1990) 4 C.J.W.L.
265.
151. Ibid. See also B.T. Stanyer, "Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections: An Example of the
Dangers of Judicial Involvement in Medical Decision Making" (1992-93) 28 Gonz. L. Rev.
121.
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complex social relations. Second, his uncomplicated acceptance of the
authority of scientific knowledge is especially of concern in the area of
reproduction. As Ruth Berman has written:
Science does not stand above the world, or apart from its conflicts; it is
rather the science of a given society. Its communal practice reflects the
needs of the dominant sector, and its way of thinking increasingly reflects
the dominant ideology. 15z
R.C. Lewontin describes some of the ways in which scientific language
reflects a gendered and imperialist world view as follows:
The metaphors of science are, indeed, filled with the violence, voyeurism,
and tumescence of male adolescent fantasy. Scientists "wrestle" with an
always female nature, to "wrest from her the truth," or to "reveal herhidden
secrets." They make "war" on diseases and "conquer" them. Good science
is "hard" science; bad science (like that refuge of so many women,
psychology) is "soft" science, and molecular biology, like physics, is
characterized by "hard inference." The method of science is largely
reductionist, taking Descartes's clock metaphor as a basis for tearing the
complex world into small bits and pieces to understand it, much as the
archetypical small boy takes apart the real clock to see what makes it
tick. 153
Dworkin presents scientific claims as devoid of interpretive difficulty
or political meaning. Indeed, he analogizes his own reasoning about "the
sacred," presumably to give it more authority, to that of astronomers who
postulated the existence of Neptune, at the time an undiscovered and
unknown planet, as the only explanation for the movements of Uranus,
a known planet.5 4 His discussion absorbs the biological construction of
women and of reproduction as well as the medical assumption of foetal
patienthood without comment or question. Because the natural order, in
his scheme, has a rationality that is given moral significance and value,
women who ultimately resist what seems like their natural and embodied
dedication to reproduction are automatically portrayed as unreasonable
and morally dangerous. Finally, Dworkin' s assumption that the "olympian
gene" 55 has presumptive moral and constitutional importance ignores the
152. R. Berman, "From Aristotle's Dualism to Materialist Dialectics: Feminist Transforma-
tion of Science and Society" in A. Jaggar&S. Bordo, eds., Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist
Reconstructions ofBeing andKnowing (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989) 224
at 250.
153. Lewontin, supra note 101 at 34-35.
154. Life's Dominion, supra note 1 at 68. In Law's Empire, Dworkin employs the same
device, stating "integrity is our Neptune" in the course of his justification for the claim that
integrity, along with fairness, justice, and procedural due process, is a distinct political ideal
(Law's Empire, supra note 32 at 183).
155. Berman, supra note 152 at 237.
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social and ideological contexts within which such causal and "natural"
primacy has historically been asserted. The "best interpretation possible"
of the abortion debate cannot succeed by ignoring the potentially com-
plex and powerful symbolism of nature and the role the idea of natural
hierarchy has played in our social and political relations.
